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College of Law: Constitutional Law - Due Process - Replevin - Right to Notice and

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Due Process-Replevin-Right to Notice and Hear.
ing Prior to Deprivation of Property. Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983
(1972).

Appellant Fuentes purchased a gas stove and service
policy from the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company. Later,
she purchased a stereophonic phonograph from Firestone
under another installment contract similar to the first. Both
contracts provided that until the purchase price was fully
paid, Firesone was to retain title to the merchandise. Mrs.
Fuentes was entitled to possession until default on her payments. The total cost of both stove and stereo, including finance charges, was about $600. With approximately $200
remaining to be paid, a dispute developed between appellant
and Firestone regarding the servicing of the stove. Claiming
that appellant had refused to make the remaining payments,
Firestone instituted an action in small claims court for repossession of the stove and stereo. Firestone simultaneously
obtained a writ of replevin. Florida procedure provided that
the clerk of court could issue the writ upon Firestone 's filling
in the appropriate blanks on a replevin form document and
posting bond.' Later the same day, a local deputy sheriff
and an agent of Firestone went to Mrs. Fuentes' home and
seized the stove and stereo. Appellant then instituted the
present action in federal district court. She sought declaratory and injunctive relief against continued enforcement of
the Florida prejudgment replevin procedures alleging violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2
The United States Supreme Court held: "[T]he Florida and
Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin provisions work a deprivation of property without due process of law insofar as
they deny the right to a prior opportunity to be heard before
chattels are taken from their possessor."'
1.

FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01-.21 (Supp. 1972).

2. Fuentes v. Shevin, ....... U.S .........

,

92 S. Ct. 1983, 1989 (1972).

3. Id. at 2002. The case of Parham v. Co'tese, a companion case to Fuentes,
challenged the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania replevin statute. Because the reasoning of the Court is applicable to either case, reference will
only be made to Fuentes.
Copyright@ 1973 by the University of Wyoming
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REPLEVIN

Present replevin statutes bear little resemblance to their
common law ancestor. An act of replevin at common law
would lie only for the recovery of property wrongfully taken
and wrongfully detained. In an action of replevin, the sheriff
was empowered, prior to judgment, to seize the disputed property from the distrainor and return it to the prior possessor.
If, on the other hand, a creditor wished to invoke state action
to recover goods wrongfully detained but not wrongfully
taken, he had to proceed through the action of detinue. Detinue did not provide for a return of the disputed property
until final judgment.' In the nineteenth century, the actions
of replevin and detinue were merged into statutory replevin.'
Typical replevin statutes today provide for seizure of
goods allegedly wrongfully detained upon the ex parte application of the plaintiff.' The clerk of court has the power to
issue the writ upon application and the plaintiff obtains
possession upon his filing of double bond.7 The defendant
can prevent the plaintiff from obtaining possession by posting
a double bond himself, in which case the defendant retains
the property sought to be replevied,' While the interim right
to possession is determined in this manner, the ultimate right
to possession of the property in question is determined upon
final judgment.'
Present Wyoming law is consistent with this general replevin concept except for one deviation. Once the property
is placed in the hands of the plaintiff, the action proceeds
as one for damages only, with no subsequent transfer of possession upon final judgment." However, where the replevin
is handled by a justice of the peace, the above deviation does
not obtain."
4. 3 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 284-85 (1927); MILLFR, COMMON
LAW PLEADINa 31-35 (1912).
5. Deschenes v. Beall, 61 Wyo. 39, 48, 154 P.2d 524, 526 (1945).
6. See, e.g., FLA. STAr. §§ 78.01-.21 (Supp. 1972).
7. E.g., Id. § 78.07. "Double bond," as used in this note, means a bond equal
to twice the value of the object sought to be replevied.
8. E.g., Id. § 78.13.
9. E.g., Id. § 78.21.
10. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-1005, -1010, -1012 (1957). Hunt v. Thompson, 19 Wyo.
523, 120 P. 181 (1912).
11. WYO. STAT. §§ 1-694, -699, to -701 (1957).
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Fuentes

In 1950, the United States Supreme Court said:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and
abstract words of the Due Process Clause but there
can be no doubt that at a minimum they require that
deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for
hearing appropriate to the nature of the case. 2
Until 1969, these words meant that there must be notice
and an opportunity to be heard before final judgment.
On June 9, 1969, the Supreme Court let fall a bombshell.
In the case of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of
Bay View, 3 the Court held the Wisconsin wage garnishment
statute unconstitutional in violation of the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. The Wisconsin statute failed
to provide for notice and a hearing prior to the prejudgment
garnishment. While the opinion in Sniadach mentioned the
requirement of notice and a hearing prior to the garnishment,"4 it dealt mainly with the theme that wages are "a specialized type of property" and the hardships affecting those
whose wages are garnished. 5
Following Sniadach, two lines of decisions appeared in
the courts. Some courts saw Sniadach as standing for the
principle that wages are to be accorded special treatment and
restricted Sniadach to its facts. 6 But a review of subsequent
decisions indicates the majority of courts saw Sniadach as
setting forth the basic idea that the due process clause required notice and hearing prior to any prejudgment remedy.
Relying on Sniadach, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
notice and hearing must be accorded prior to garnishment of
12. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
This case held that notice must be given to known beneficiaries of a trust
prior to a settling of accounts.
13. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
14. Id. at 342.
15. Id. at 340.
16. E.g., Hilburn v. Butz, 40 U.S.L.W. 2833 (5th Cir. June 2, 1972) (held that
the Secretary of Agriculture may withhold sums admittedly due a farmer
as an offset against sums determined without a hearing to have been overpaid); American Olean Tile Co., Inc. v. Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150 (D.
Hawaii 1970) (garnishment of a business' regular checking account, payroll account and accounts receivable without a prior hearing was not a
violation of due process).
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funds in a checking account. The court said, "Clearly, a due
process violation should not depend upon the type of property
being subjected to the procedure."" United States district
courts held the New York replevin statute and the California
and Illinois Innkeeper's Lien Laws unconstitutional for not
requiring notice and hearing prior to seizure of property."5
Another district court held that a creditor holding a secured
instrument, which gave a right of repossession upon default
by the debtor, could not privately repossess without giving
notice and a prior hearing because he was acting under color
of state law. 9
In 1970, the United States Supreme Court held that,
regardess of whether welfare benefits are entitled a "privilege" or a "right," they cannot be denied without notice and
a prior hearing.2" The Court said, "The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient . . . depends upon whether the recipient's interest in avoiding that
loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary adjudication." 2 1 The Court found the possibility that an indigent
might wrongfully be deprived of welfare assistance to outweigh the desire to protect public funds. The Supreme Court
has also required notice and hearing prior to the posting of
notices forbidding sale of liquors to those who drink excessively," prior to the suspension of a driver's license,2" prior
to the taking of a child of an unwed father, 4 and prior to the
revocation of parole. 5
17. Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969). Accord,
Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d
87 (1970).
18. Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970);
Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Collins v. Viceroy Hotel
Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
19. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). The statute involved
was CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9503, 9504 (West 1964) (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 9-503, -504). This case is discussed later in the note.
20. Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
21. Id. at 262-63.
22. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
23. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
24. Stanley v. Illinois, - .... U.S ......... , 92 S. Ct. 1208 (1972).
25. Morrissey v. Brewer ........U.S-.......
92 S. Ct. 2593 (1972).
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Fuentes DECISION

Although only a small step in the developing area of law
regarding prejudgment remedies, the Supreme Court's decision in Fuentes completely changed the law of replevin. The
Court noted that the Florida statute allowed a writ of replevin to be issued by the clerk of court upon the bare assertion
of the plaintiff-creditor that he was entitled to one, that he
file a double bond and that he promise to prosecute his action
without delay.26 The net effect was that the person whose
property was taken learned of the action the moment his
property was seized from him. He was given no prior opportunity to challenge issuance of the writ." The Florida replevin statute was unconstitutional because it failed to provide
notice and an opportunity for a hearing "at a meaningful
time," i.e., before seizure."
At the heart of the Court's ruling that notice and an opportunity to be heard are necessary before seizure was the desire to minimize mistaken deprivations of property. "[W] hen
a person has an opportunity to speak up in his own defense,
and when the State must listen to what he has to say, substantively unfair and simply mistaken deprivations of property
interests can be prevented. ' This theme has been echoed
in other recent Supreme Court cases involving prejudgment
actions.3" The traditional safeguards deterring excessive and
unwarranted use of the writ of replevin are the posting of a
double bond, the allegation by affidavit of the plaintiff that
he is entitled to the property sought to be replevied and the
liability of the plaintiff for damages should his replevin action fail. These safeguards, said the Court, go only to test
the strength of the plaintiff's own belief and do not substitute for a hearing before a neutral official prior to the seizure.
Even if the plaintiff is liable for damages following an ad26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

FLA. STAT. §§ 78.01 and .07 (Supp. 1972).
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 1991-93.
Id. at 1994.
Id.
"[T]ermination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility
may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while
he waits." Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 20, at 264. "This appellee was not
afforded a chance to defend herself. She may have been the victim of an
official's caprice." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, supre note 22, at 437.
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verse decision, the Court "has not ... embraced the general
proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone."
The Court also points out:
[I]f an applicant for the writ knows that he is dealing with an uneducated, uninformed consumer with
little access to legal help and little familiarity with
legal procedures, there may be a substantial possibility that a summary seizure of property-however
unwarranted-may go unchallenged, and the applicant may feel that he can act with impunity.2
In the Court's view, a deprivation of property is not
limited by duration of deprivation, partial ownership, or
whether the item sought to be replevied is or is not a "necessity." The right to a prior hearing must be afforded any deprivation of property within the protection of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court was not concerned with the fact that
Mrs. Fuentes had the right, under the Florida statute, to regain the seized property within three days upon the posting
of a double bond. A three day deprivation was a deprivation
within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. So would
by the payment of the double bond to regain possession." The
length and severity of a deprivation are only factors to be
weighed in the form of hearing to be required. The due process clause also extends to "any significant property interest." 4 Mrs. Fuentes clearly had a possessory interest in the
stove and stereo purchased by installment contract, although,
by the term of those contracts, she was not the title owner.
Although her right to continued possession was in dispute,
she could not be deprived of that right without a hearing.
Nor was the right to a prior hearing destroyed by the fact that
31. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 1995, citing from Stanley v. Illinois,
supra note 24, at 1210-11.
32. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 1995 n.13. Accord, Laprease v. Raymours
Furniture Co., supra note 18, at 723 n.ll: "The ability to make good the
threat to repossess . . . coupled with inability of the consumer to post
security for the return of the goods, often results in the abandonment by
the impecunious purchaser of defenses he may have to a replevin, and instead, agreement to the terms imposed by the seller."
33. "The economic burden [of posting bond] which defendant has sustained to
achieve the result is one which stems directly from the garnishment proceedings. It inflicts a hardship which is different only in form and not
in substance." Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services, Inc., supra note 17,
at 91.
l4. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971).
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the items replevied were not "necessities." The Court said
that it was not up to it to make a determination of what is or
is not a "necessity," adding, "The Fourteenth Amendment
speaks of 'property' generally." 3 5
The Court recognized that there were extraordinary circumstances which might justify summary seizure without
the opportunity for prior notice and hearing. Such an instance would be if the creditor could show that the debtor intended to destroy or conceal the property. " But the Court
found no such unusual situation presented by the facts of the
case nor was the Florida statute narrowly drawn to meet such
a contingency. The Court found that the "State acts largely
in the dark" 3 7 : No state official participated in the issuance
of the writ-Firestone unilaterally invoked the power of the
state to settle a private dispute. As such, the prejudgment
replevin statute served no important governmental or general public inerest. The "extraordinary circumstances" requirement for a pre-hearing seizure suggests a weighing of
the creditor's interest against the debtor's interest similar
to that stated by Goldberg."
Lastly, the Court met the contention that Mrs. Fuentes
had waived her right to due process by language in the contracts that upon default the seller might "take back" or "repossess" the merchandise. The Court said, "[A] waiver of
constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be
clear. The contracted language relied upon must, on its face,
amount to a waiver."" Since the contracts said nothing about
any waiver nor anything about how the seller might retake
the merchandise, the Court found the contractual language
unclear and thus no waiver of due process.
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 1999.
Other situations include attachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in
state courts and seizure of property "to collect the internal revenue of the
United States, to meet the needs of a national war effort, to protect against
the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food." Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2,
at 1999 n.23, 2000.
37. Id. at 2001.
38. But see Morrissey v. Brewer, supra note 25, at 2600: "The question is not
merely the 'weight' of the individual's interest, but whether the nature of
the interest is one within the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment."
39. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 2002.
35.
36.
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WAIVER OF DUE PROCESS RIGHTS

The Supreme Court, in determining whether Mrs.
Fuentes had waived her right to notice and prior hearing,
leaned heavily on the criteria set forth in D. H. Overmyer Co.,
Inc., of Ohio v. Frick Covpany. ° In that case, the Court had
said, "The due process rights to notice and hearing prior to
civil judgment are subject to waiver."'
The Court then
qualified its position by saying, "[W]here the contract is one
of adhesion, where there is great disparity in bargaining
power, and where the debtor receives nothing for the cognovit
provision, other legal consequences may ensue." 4 2 In short,
the facts of the transaction are important in determining if
there has been an effective waiver of constitutional rights.
The Court in Fuentes,held that there had been no waiver
of due process by appellant because the contractual language
purportedly waiving due process was unclear. The Court also
alluded to the fact that the appellant was not made aware of
the significance of the "fine print" nor was there any bargaining between the contracting parties.4 From the reasoning
presented in Overmyer and Fuentes, the existence of a waiver
of constitutional rights thus appears to turn on the presence
of three factual criteria: First, clarity of the contractual
language. Second, that the debtor was made aware of the significance of the language and intelligently signed the contract. Third, the equality of bargaining power of the parties.
It would seem reasonable that a party to a printed form
contract, who was made aware of the terms of waiver and
their significance and who signed with full knowledge of the
consequences, would waive his due process rights, even though
there was inequality of bargaining power present. The concept of freedom of contract weighs heavily on our law. But
increasingly, courts are beginning to see that, in some situations, there is no freedom of contract between those of unequal
bargaining power:
40. 405 U.S. 174, 92 S. Ct. 775 (1972). This case involved the validity of a cognovit note executed between two large companies. The Court held that the
debtor waived his right to notice prior to judgment.
41. Id. at 782.
42. Id. at 783.
43. Fuentes v. Shevin, smpra note 2, at 2002.
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We take judicial notice of the fact that form leases
are put before tenants on an "accept this or get
nothing" basis... and that tenants-who need housing-are compelled to sign. There is no freedom of
contract-there is merely a freedom to adhere to the
terms of the contract written by the landlord."'
The District Court for the Southern District of California
took a more pragmatic approach:
If the provisions of a contract can legitimize summary repossession, wage garnishment might then be
valid on the same theory, as long as private agreement could be shown. This would fly in the face of
the reasoning in Sniadach and is rejected by this
court. "
Of the three criteria affecting a valid waiver, as set forth
above, the first two are clearly within the control of the
creditor. He can write specific language into his "form"
contract and can point out the "fine print" to the debtor
before the debtor signs. The creditor can even explain the
clause if necessary. As to the third, contracts of adhesion
are falling into disrepute in some courts and a waiver clause
may or may not be upheld. But the creditor can at least
attempt to meet the requirement of equality of bargaining
power by offering to give a discount to the debtor for the
inclusion of any waiver clause.
SELF-HELP

"At present, creditors may not utilize statutory procedures for summary taking which have been enforced through
the use of sheriffs or marshals, yet creditors may effect the
same type of summary taking through 'self-help.'" ,46 The
Supreme Court, in Fuentes, clearly stated that only interests
protected by the fourteenth amendment were encompassed in
its holding.47 The protection of the fourteenth amendment
44. Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (tenant did
not waive his rights to notice and hearing prior to a distress sale). Accord,
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., supra note 18, at 724.
45. Adams v. Egley, supra note 19, at 621.
46. Ordin, Summary CreditorRemedies: A Thing of the Past? 47 Los ANGELES
BAn BULL. 230, 240 (1972).
47. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 1996.
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extends to any deprivation of life, liberty or property without
due process by any state. Thus, a citizen is not protected by
the fourteenth amendment from a deprivation of "due process" by another citizen. A private party may repossess, if
the contract so states and he can do so without breach of the
peace, although the sheriff, acting for the party may not,
without giving notice or a prior hearing.
However, even a private repossession may come within
the purview of the fourteenth amendment under some circmnstances. In Adams v. Egley, 5 the court applied the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Reitman v. Mulkey"5 to a case of private repossession. In doing so, the court
held that California's statutory equivalent of Uniform Commercial Code Sections 9-503 and 9-504 violated the due process
clause."
Involved in Adams were two instances of private repossession under secured contracts. In one contract, the creditor
was given "all the rights and remedies . . .under the California Uniform Commercial Code." In the other, the creditor merely had the right to "immediate possession" in the
event of default. 1 The court held that both repossessions
were executed under color of state law and were illegal.5 - The
court found that the presence of Sections 9-503 and 9-504 had
a significant impact on the contracts' provisions and was state
encouragement of a deprivation of due process." In closing,
the court felt that the statute was not "exempt from constitutional scrutiny merely because its operation [was] confined
to situations involving the presence of a contract." 4 It would
48. Supra note 19.
49. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). The Court held that a statute giving people an absolute discretion to sell and rent real property to whomever they chose violated the equal protection clause. The Court reasoned that the statute "significantly encourage[d] and involve[d] the State in private discriminations." Id. at 381.
50. CAL. COMM. CODE §§ 9503, 9504 (West 1964). Wyoming has a similar provision. WYo. STAT. §§ 34-9-503, -504 (Supp. 1971). UCC 9-503 reads: "Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace ..
51. Adams v. Egley, supra note 19, at 616.
52. "In cases under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently
been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966).
53. Adams v. Egley, supra note 19, at 617.
54. Id. at 620.
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appear a ruling of this kind is available only once: The first
creditor who takes "immediate possession" of secured property is acting "under color" of a state law which is unconstitutional and thus his repossession is illegal. In this first action, the statute is declared unconstitutional and void. Shortly
thereafter, another creditor takes "immediate possession"
of secured property. Since the prior statute is void, he is not
acting "under color of state law" and his repossession is legal
because it is for a private action not falling within the scope
of the fourteenth amendment.
NECESSARY

STATUTORY REVISION

The ordinary creditor, as a result of the Fuentes decision,
is indeed in a difficult position. In all likelihood, he has not
met the criteria for an effective waiver of notice and a prior
hearing, set forth supra. He would probably submit to a
hearing if there was a procedure for one, but at this time
there is none." Any attempt to institute a hearing and either
require or compel the presence of the defendant would be met
by the claim that the hearing is ultra vires and void. As
Fuentes points out, the solution to this problem rests squarely
with the legislature2
In revising the present replevin statutes, the legislature
must provide for notice and hearing prior to seizure, for a
hearing that will establish "at least the probable validity"
of the creditor's claim," and for the "extraordinary circumstances" in which seizure before a hearing are thought to be
necessary. The United States Supreme Court has on more
than one occasion stated that the procedural requirements of
due process are flexible and that the requirements of a hearing will vary depending on the weight of the interests involved. 8 The pre-seizure hearing need not take the form of a
The Wyoming replevin statutes do not provide for a hearing prior to
seizure. WYo. STAT. §§ 1-693 to -707, -1000 to -1017 (1957). Nor do the
constitutional or statutory grants of authority to the district judges, clerks
of court or justices of the peace provide for authority to hold a prejudgment
hearing in a replevin action. WYo. CONST. art. 5, §§ 1, 10, 13. WYO. STAT.
§§ 5-53, -91, -139, -140 (1957).
56. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 2002.
57. Id. at 2003; Bell v. Burson, supra note 23, at 540.
58. Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 1999 n.21; Bell v. Burson, supra note
23, at 540; Boddie v. Connecticut, supra note 34, at 378.

55.
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judicial proceeding."' The hearing is only concerned with
the probable validity of the plaintiff's claim or the reasonable
possibility of judgment for the plaintiff. If the hearing determines the probable validity of the plaintiff's claim, the
prejudgment seizure is then constitutionally valid.
The Supreme Court has stated the basic requirements of
a hearing if it is to satisfy the requirements of due process:"
First,there must be timely and adequate written notice of the
allegations against the defendant. Second, there must be a
disclosure of adverse evidence. Third, there must be an opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and
documentary evidence. Fourth, there must be the right to
confront and cross examine adverse witnesses (unless the
hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing
confrontation). Fifh., there must be a neutral official in
charge of the hearing who need not be a judicial officer nor
a lawyer. Sixth, there must be written findings as to the
evidence relied upon and action taken. In Goldberg, it was
additionally stipulated that the right to have counsel present,
if desired, must also be afforded.6 1 In Wyoming, the requirement of a neutral state official could be easily handled by
the present justices of the peace. Notwithstanding their present jurisdictional limit of $200,62 they would not be rendering
a final judgment, but only making a preliminary finding as
to the "probable validity" of the plaintiff's claim.
The Fuentes decision also requires that if the legislature
desires to permit any type of summary seizure of property, it
must narrowly draw the statute to meet only extraordinary
or unusual circumstances. The Court noted two general areas
when summary seizure would be constitutionally allowed: (1)
If there was an important governmental or general public
interest" or (2) in "cases in which a creditor could make a
showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or
59. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 20, at 266.
60. Id. at 267-68 (this case involved termination of welfare benefits without a
prior hearing) ; Morrissey v. Brewer, supra note 25, at 2604 (this case involved revocation of parole without a prior hearing).
61. Goldberg v. Kelly, supra note 20, at 270.
62. WYO. STAT. § 1-693 (1957).
63. See note 36 supra.
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conceal disputed goods." 64 A replevin statute would concern
only the latter category. In drafting a replevin statute to
meet unusual situations in which pre-hearing seizure is desirable, the legislature should look to the Wyoming attachment statute
which delineates special circumstances as
grounds of attachment and has served the state since 1886.
In light of the decision of Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Company,6 the legislature should also consider our statutes which allow the officer executing the writ to break into
any building, upon refusal of entry, in order to seize the
property. The district court, in Laprease,held that an entry
and seizure in execution a writ of replevin violated the fourth
amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures. The court said, "If the Sheriff cannot invade the
privacy of a home without a warrant when the state interest
is to prevent a crime, he should not be able to do so to retrieve
a stove or refrigerator about which the right to possession
is disputed." 8
CONCLUSION

Although these added requirements of procedural due
process appear extensive and would be a great economic burden should all defendants demand a hearing, the Supreme
Court is probably correct in its forecast that most debtors,
sensing the futility of appearing, will fail to appear at any
hearing." These procedures afford only an opportunity for
a hearing prior to seizure. Following statutory revision, the
result will be that, in the vast majority of cases, replevin actions will proceed as before. The only difference will be that
the writ of replevin will be executed a few days after the
creditor files his application for a writ, rather than the same
afternoon.
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Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 2000-01.
Wyo. STAT. § 1-226 (1957).
Supra note 18.
Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-704, -1015 (1957).
Laprease v. Raymours Furniture Co., supra note 18, at 722,
Fuentes v. Shevin, supra note 2, at 2000 n.29.
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